



Organisational Misbehaviour and Management Control in China’s 
Public Hospitals: Doctors’ Red Packets 
 
Abstract  This paper investigates Chinese doctors’ informal payment, known as red 
packets, with reference to the debate on organisational misbehaviour, fiddles and 
control. It aims to examine the internal and external factors that have contributed to 
the emergence of red packets in health services and the strategies of hospital 
management in dealing with informal payment. Data collected from two hospitals 
show that doctors’ misbehaviour is closely related to a number of structural issues 
embedded in contemporary China’s public health services – funding issues, payment 
systems, corruption and motivation – but more importantly the study demonstrates the 
rationality of employee fiddles and management responses. Findings indicate that 
doctors are mainly responsible for this fiddling, unethical and illegal activity because 
of the financial gains acquired from patient bribery. However, doctor misbehaviour 
remains under management’s latent control as long as hospital income generation and 
reputation are not severely threatened. The study contributes to the analysis of 
informal payment in the field of organisational studies and employment relations, 
with a fresh perspective offered to extend our understanding of red packets in the 
context of healthcare marketisation reform. 
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1 Introduction 
Work related misconduct, such as deviance, cheats and sabotage, is not only pervasive 
but also costly for organisations (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Mars, 1982; Vardi 
and Wiener, 1996). These activities have been defined as organisational misbehaviour, 
which refers to ‘any intentional action by members of organizations that defies and 
violates (a) shared organizational norms and expectations, and/or (b) core societal 
values, mores and standards of proper conduct’ (Vardi and Wiener, 1996, p.153). As a 
prominent feature of work and employment, organisational misbehaviour has been the 
focal point of study for a long time by industrial sociologists (Collinson, 2000; 
Burawoy, 1979; Watson, 2003), industrial relations commentators (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 1998) Edwards and Scullion, 1982) and organisational behaviour writers 
(Coleman, 1994; Robinson and Bennett, 1995). Studies have ranged from 
conventional themes such as cheats (Mars, 1982) and misconduct at work (Vardi, 
2001), to closer examination of surviving strategies (Noon and Blyton, 2007), humour 
(Collinson, 2000), resistance (Knights and McCabe, 2000) and management 
misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). 
However, such rich literature and emerging scope for research in the West are in 
sharp contrast with the limited examination of organisational misbehaviour in China. 
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The consensus from existing studies is that organisational misbehaviour widely exists 
at all levels of organisations (Richards, 2008). Hence China’s changing workplace 
regime will not be clearly understood without a proper exploration of a variety of 
organisational misbehaviour. In the context of social-economic advancement and 
health service reform in China, the compelling issue of ‘informal payment’ needs to 
be closely evaluated with reference to misbehaviour because current studies on this 
issue mainly focus on the implications for health service quality. This is particularly 
reflected by the lack of necessary attention to informal payment, so-called ‘red 
packets.’ To fill this research gap, a study has been conducted to answer the following 
questions: what are the main factors contributing to the emergence of red packets? 
Who are responsible for red packets and what are management strategies in dealing 
with red packets? Central to these enquires is the conceptualisation of red packets 
through an organisational misbehaviour framework and the analysis of fiddle and 
control. 
Data collected from two Chinese hospitals allows the query of red packets to be 
evaluated by considering both individual and organisational factors. The research 
seeks to contribute to an enhanced understanding of doctors’ red packet behaviour in 
the field of organisational studies and employment relations, with particular reference 
to fiddle, cheat and management control. This paper attempts to furnish a missing 
element in the existing literature on red packets by configuring the extent to which 
doctors’ informal pay can be categorised as a fiddle activity as conceptualised by 
Mars (2008), and by examining the dynamics of management control (Edwards, 1988) 
in the workplace. 
The rest of the paper is structured into six sections. First, it will provide an 
introduction to red packets in China’s hospitals and the current research agenda on 
informal payment. Second, it will review the existing literature on organisational 
misbehaviour by looking at various types of misbehaviour and their implications, 
especially in reference to the debate around fiddle, conflict and control. Third, it will 
discuss the research methods of the case study, before presenting the major findings in 
the next section. In the final section, the paper will further analyse the findings and 
summarise the conclusion and implications of the research by addressing red packets, 
fiddle and control as reflected by doctors’ professional character and management’s 
strategies. 
 
2 Red Packets in China’s Hospitals 
The term ‘red packets’ is shorthand for the informal payment given by patients to 
health workers. It is a wide-spread practice and one of the most frequently discussed 
topics in contemporary Chinese health services (Yang, 2013). In many ways informal 
pay has a long history in China, and has been labelled with different terms: red 
packets (as used in this article), red envelopes and red packages. Its original Chinese 
term is hongbao, and in this context represents patients’ gratitude towards doctors and 
nurses in exchange for better services. In Chinese society, red packets are regarded as 
gifts and the recipients are expected to benefit the gift-givers in order to sustain and 
develop social ties between individuals (Zhou and Zhang, 2004). As an important 
instrument, red packets have a key role in developing personal relations, guanxi. For 
the purpose of establishing and maintaining a guanxi relationship, one is likely to use 
monetary and instrumental red packets to establish reciprocity. This guanxi exchange 
process, characterised by mutual economic gains, is often informal, complicated and 
  
non-transparent, and the outcome of the exchange is not always clear and predictable 
(Fan, 2007). As Gaal, Belli, McKee and Szoscka (2006) highlight, there is a 
deep-seated cultural dimension to some informal payments since gift giving is a 
cross-cultural phenomenon that is an integral part of normal social relations, including 
in the health sector, used as a means to build trust between patients and health 
workers. 
Although informal payment is a worldwide phenomenon in medical services, 
especially in most post-communist or transitioning economies (Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 
2007; Cohen, 2012), the scale and impact of red packets on China’s health care are 
more significant than many people realise (Yang, 2013). In a recent national survey, 
hospital doctors were regarded as one of the most corrupt occupational groups in 
China, rated by 74.2% of the respondents (Tam, 2011). This striking fact demonstrates 
the prevalence of red packets, as the public trust in doctors and hospitals has been 
deeply eroded by this form of corruption (Lewis, 2007). Year after year, there have 
been many government campaigns trying to eliminate the phenomena through tough 
sanctions (Yang, 2013), but red packets seem to be pervasive. As a recent 
measurement, the Chinese central government has required that from May 2014, all 
level 2 and above hospitals have to implement a contract system which asks patients 
and doctors to sign a no-red-packet agreement before hospitalisation (National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, 2014). However, this might be another fruitless 
effort which will not be successfully implemented because it appears rather symbolic 
(Huang, 2014). Nonetheless, the vivid debate about doctors’ red packets continuously 
attracts considerable attention from the general public, media and government 
authorities. 
A few recent investigations focus on doctors’ informal pay, although they are 
mainly concerned with the implications for the quality and equality of the Chinese 
health care system (e.g. Bloom, Han and Li, 2001; Fan, 2007; Lewis, 2007), and the 
overall evaluation of doctors’ pay and employment relations (Cao, 2014). Elsewhere 
there is growing interest in analysing doctors’ informal pay in Europe, especially 
eastern Europe and some southern EU countries such as Greece (e.g. Gaal et al., 2006; 
Liaropoulos, Siskou, Kaitelidou, Theodorou and Katostaras, 2008). In a discussion of 
doctors’ informal pay in developing and transition countries including China, Lewis 
attributes informal pay to two reasons: one is an outgrowth of the breakdown of poor 
governance and the absence of accountability in public service delivery, and the other 
is the lack of proper management and penalties (Lewis, 2007). For Lewis (2007), 
dysfunctional management in hospitals and negligence may create opportunities for 
doctors to take such action. Informal pay has also been linked with doctors’ formal 
salaries, because their insufficient wages may push them to supplement their income 
(Fan, 2007). Yet overall there is a tendency to associate doctors’ pay issues with 
controversial health care reform, since the government’s new funding policies have 
provided numerous opportunities and incentives for hospitals to engage in 
organisational corruption (Tam, 2011). As hospitals need to generate more income 
from the market, health workers such as doctors are encouraged to be more active in 
finding financial gains, some of which have become their own gains (Bloom et al., 
2001). 
3 Conceptual Reflections on Doctors’ Informal Pay 
3.1  Red Packets and Organisational Misbehaviour 
 
  
Theoretically, doctors’ red packet activity can be categorised as a type of 
misbehaviour in the field of organisation studies. Organisational misbehaviour 
appears to be a universal misconduct phenomenon in the workplace, although it has a 
variety of forms, intensity, severity and frequency (Vardi and Wiener, 1996). For 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), organisations can produce misbehaviour such as 
non-compliant or counter-productive behaviours, which are affected by organisations’ 
ways of shaping and directing employee behaviour over time. Another type is 
employee deviance, voluntary behaviour that violates organisational norms and 
threatens the well-beings of individuals or organisations (Robinson and Bennet, 1995). 
But most misconduct activities are subtle misbehaviours or organisational crime, such 
as sabotage, culture, humour or harassment, and they are hard to identify and measure 
(Ditto, 1977; van de Broek and Dundon, 2012). Furthermore, although organisational 
misbehaviour is a lasting feature of organisations, ‘misbehaviour continues to develop 
according to the nature of modern organisations, the people who work within them, 
and to an extent reflects broader social, political and technological trends’ (Richards, 
2008, p.654). 
Many factors have been identified in relation to organisational misbehaviour, as the 
motives, frequency and intensity of organisational misbehaviour vary in different 
circumstances (Vardi, 2001). For Vardi and Wiener (1996), two main types of 
antecedents are individual factors such as personality and dissatisfaction, and 
organisational factors such as goals and culture. Organisational culture, including the 
organisational climate and the ethical climate, is regarded as the major force 
influencing all kinds of behaviour, characterised by employees’ emotional comfort 
and support and the reward system (Vardi, 2001). But the ethical climate has a more 
immediate impact on misbehaviour than the organisational climate, and misbehaviour 
is rooted in ‘the organizationally espoused values and precepts’ (Vardi, 2001, p.326). 
Conventional organisational analysis tends to associate misbehaviour with negative 
impact, e.g. more or less destructive phenomena (Richards, 2008). For Vardi and 
Wiener (1996), misconduct is damaging if it simultaneously violates both societal and 
organisational values through harassing members, sabotaging work and vandalising 
equipment. When the intention is to hurt others or organisations, misbehaviour will 
cause damage, even if the damage is subtle or minor (Vardi and Wiener, 1996). This 
seems to be a reasonable explanation, but it does not reflect the nature of deviant 
behaviour; for example doctors’ informal pay is not intended to cause damage to 
individual patients or hospitals, although some consequences may be damaging. 
 
3.2  Fiddles and Red Packets 
 
A closer portrait of red packets is exhibited in the study of workplace fiddles and 
pilferage (Ditton, 1977; Mars, 1982), a significant dimension of misbehaviour 
analysis for industrial sociologists (Richards, 2008). Fiddles are characterised by 
workers who recurrently break rules through theft or pilferage and actively 
re-negotiate them on a continuous basis (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995). As part of 
the organisational subculture, fiddling is dependent upon the context and legitimate 
structure within organisations so fiddles can be delicately balanced between legitimate 
and non-legitimate activities (Ditton, 1977). On the other hand, the existence of 
fiddles does not mean these behaviours are immune from being detected. For instance, 
when fiddles become visible, society will show resentment, envy and occasional 
social outrage (Mars, 1982). Based on his grid categories, Mars (1982) classifies four 
different types of fiddles relating to various professions, namely hawks, donkeys, 
  
wolves and vultures that are characterised by different degrees of autonomy, group 
identity and organisational control. 
Hawks are usually more independent professionals who are able to take advantage 
of their skills by swooping to opportunities and being energetic, adaptable and 
resourceful (Mars, 1982). Typical jobs include highly skilled professionals such as 
doctors, managers and academics. For hawks, fiddles and flexibility are common 
because this is how their work is done. There are a wide range of fiddles for hawks, 
from direct occupational crime to tax evasion to perks, but the key for hawk 
professionals is that they have occupational freedom which allows them to fiddle. A 
typical example, as Mars (1982) notes, is that some successful surgeons keep working 
in the British National Health Services where formal pay is relatively low, since they 
can get more informal fringe benefits at work. In contrast, vulture professions are 
mostly semi-skilled craftsmen with a strong group dimension, as their autonomy for 
fiddling is less independent and subject to bureaucratic control. 
Compared with hawk and vulture jobs, donkey and wolf jobs are taken by less 
skilled workers whose fiddles differ from what doctors, for example, can do. The 
typology developed by Mars (1982) is an important categorisation for analysing cheat 
behaviour, although in reality the examination of workplace fiddles needs to be 
associated with circumstances. Nevertheless, the complexity of work and employment 
means that many behaviours and misbehaviours are not always straightforward, and 
doctors’ red packets need to be carefully evaluated with reference to the particular 
context within which doctors can take advantage of their profession. Particularly 
when considering cultural elements such as guanxi, red packet activity is distinctive 
from hawk and vulture-type fiddles. 
 




To a certain extent red packets are linked with organisational corruption or 
mismanagement. Research has found that Chinese doctors’ reputations are being 
undermined due to the prevalence of organisational corruption, with a weakened and 
lower level of patients’ trust towards health professionals and hospitals (Tam, 2011). 
As Cohen (2012) highlights, corruption is an important structural factor that can 
explain the informal payment phenomenon in many countries’ health services. When 
red packets have become an unspoken rule in health services, patients have to follow 
because they are frightened of otherwise being disadvantaged (Kong, Du, Zhao, Yang, 
and Qin, 2011). Kickbacks between pharmaceutical or equipment companies and 
hospital management or doctors have become an open secret as almost every doctor 
and manager, if associated with drug or equipment selling, may be given a variety of 
red-packets (Tam, 2011; Zhou and Zhang, 2004). In the context of the endemic 
organisational corruption within health services, perhaps it is not surprising that red 
packets are wide-spread among doctors. 
Another organisational reason contributing to informal pay is that doctors’ formal 
pay is too low to reflect their professional contributions. For Lewis (2007), many 
doctors in developing countries are concerned about low and irregular salary 
payments accompanied by a lack of government attention and insufficient 
contributions from patients to formal fees. Lower levels of job satisfaction, partly 
caused by doctors’ feelings about job insecurity, is another motive for accepting 
informal payments (Stringhini, Thomas, Bidwell, Mtui and Mwisongo, 2009). As a 
  
result, patients may regard low pay as an impetus to contribute to doctors informally, 
although the informal pay comes with their hope for establishing good relationships 
and the cultural traditions of gratitude (Lewis, 2007).  However, studies have also 
found that a substantial increase in fees and salaries by itself would not have a serious 
impact on doctors’ behaviour (Liaropoulos et al., 2008). In other words, purely 




Since health workers are the recipients of red packets, they should be the ones mainly 
held responsible for their own unethical or illegal behaviour. Cohen (2012) regards 
individual corruption as a key factor that can explain the phenomenon since red 
packets are counter to doctors’ professional integrity. For Fan (2007), this problem 
also reflects the failure of modern Chinese health services in maintaining the 
traditional Confucian ideology that appreciates the proper use of financial and 
spiritual rewards. On the other hand, accusing doctors and patients cannot effectively 
help policy makers because both have simply adapted to the rules of the game to 
survive (Gaal et al., 2008, p.270). As one of the major concerns for China’s health 
services, corruption has seriously damaged the medicine-patient relationship and the 
efficiency of the service. One solution, as suggested by Fan (2007), is to not only 
abolish distorting governmental funding policies but also to adopt the traditional 
Confucian moral approach to re-establish a rightly directed appreciation of the proper 
financial reward. When corruption is part of daily life in transitional countries, 
sanctions against individual health workers would not have much impact because 
policies must focus on the broader context of regulation to reduce the overall level of 
corruption in society (Ensor, 2004). 
 
Misbehaviour, fiddle and management control 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of organisational misbehaviour provides a strong 
case for categorising red packets as one of workplace fiddle or cheating activities. For 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), organisational misbehaviour can be very prevalent 
and varied in content and recurrent in normal working situations. The fiddle 
perspective, as suggested by Mars (1982), maintains that doctors are one of the 
professionals who are able to take advantage of their position to gain economically 
through their positions. Again, doctors can be categorised into both ‘hawk’ and 
‘vulture’ professions whose fiddle activities are part of their daily work (Mars, 2008), 
since doctors have professional freedom and independence that can help them cheat 
and are not easily caught by management. For management, the strategy for dealing 
with fiddles may be direct or indirect, but management endeavours to retain final 
control over productivity and quality. Often management will tolerate workers’ fiddle 
activities to a certain extent (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995) because such fiddle 
activities can help to secure employees’ co-operation. As Blyton and Turnbull (1998) 
indicate, management may show a kind of persistence of a pragmatic and 
opportunistic approach to elicit employees’ compliance rather than active cooperation. 
For many hospital managers, the attempts to control hawk fiddles are likely to fail 
(Mars, 1982), because these organisations must rely on professionals who persistently 
have freedom. But ultimately, employment relations strategies are based on 
management’s basic objective that is aimed to ‘secure and maintain a predictable, 
productive and cost-effective labour force’ (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998, p.335). More 
  
importantly, fiddles sometimes can help to achieve organisational targets. Therefore, 
‘many “unofficial” practices can, by interpreting formal expectations, contribute to 
managerial goals’ (Edwards, 1988, p.189). Even if some fiddles are known to 
management, perpetrators like doctors may be tolerated when their official jobs are 
done, and control mechanisms must co-exist with misbehaviours. 
4 Research Methods 
To broaden the understanding of red packets, case studies were carried out in two 
Chinese public hospitals and interviews were conducted with doctors, managers and 
trade union officials. Case studies are said to be ‘suitable to provide further 
understanding for complex social phenomena and the power relations between 
management and workers’ (Kitay and Callus, 1998, p.101). Two hospitals were 
selected, one in Beijing and another in Guangdong province in south China. Case 
study hospital B is a municipal city general hospital in Beijing, with a large number of 
staff, good and modern facilities and relatively good pay. Case study hospital G is a 
county general hospital in Guangdong, with a relatively lower level of pay and a 
smaller number of doctors mainly serving a rural population. There are geographic 
and demographic differences between the two case hospitals; however, the study tries 
to distinguish common issues over doctors’ informal pay and its implications for 
misbehavior and employment relations. 
An economically advanced place such as Beijing can generate more resources, 
including financial and human resources, for its local hospitals. On the contrary a 
county hospital such as case study hospital G has less financial investment and less 
advanced equipment, as well as a smaller scale of organisation. Table 1 compares the 
two case study hospitals regarding their location, types and general background. 
Because of the disparities in local economies and the existence of a ‘strong urban bias’ 
in allocating Chinese health resources (Anand, Fan, Zhang, Zhang, Ke, Dong and 
Chen, 2008, p.1776), the two case study hospitals differ in several aspects. First, most 
doctors in case study hospital G come from a provincial medical school or local 
universities, whereas in case study hospital B most doctors come from better medical 
schools in Beijing. Second, as income levels in Beijing are higher than in the county 
where the case study hospital G is located, most doctors in hospital B earn more. 
Third, medical facilities and equipment are much better in Beijing, and the buildings 
of case study hospital B are newer and more advanced. 
 
Table 1  The Two Case Study Hospitals 
 Case study hospital B Case study hospital G 
Location Beijing Guangdong Province 
Type City General Hospital County General hospital 
Grade Second Division Class A Second Division Class A 
Scale  1,012 staff, 424 doctors (male 
160, female 264) 
820 staff, 305 doctors (male 
184, female 121) 
Ward 900 beds 400 beds 
Local population 3,000,000 600,000 
(Source: Fieldwork materials from the case study hospitals) 
 
During the fieldwork, 39 semi-structured interviews were conducted, 24 with 
  
doctors, 5 with managers and 3 with full-time union officials in the case hospitals. In 
addition, two officials from doctors’ professional bodies were also interviewed. Other 
interviewees include health officials in the central and local governments, health 
economists, and an official from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). 
Interview responses were used as the main evidence to reflect perceptions of the 
practitioners and managers regarding informal payment, together with an examination 
of the data from documentation. Most documents come from the case study hospitals, 
government health authorities, trade unions and government bodies. 
Except for commonly deployed ethical considerations such as anonymity and 
confidentiality, the researcher took into consideration culturally related research 
challenges, especially during the data collection process. Interviews with managers 
and some doctors had to be carefully handled because conversation languages may be 
sensitive about pay-related topics. Many research respondents have low levels of 
experience in taking part in academic research so their answers should be interpreted 
with special care (Stening and Zhang, 2007). One tactic in this research is to 
cross-check different sources of data and compare between documents, interviews and 
literature to avoid the potential problem of subjectivity. 
5 Red Packets in the Case Study Hospitals 
Evidence shows that many doctors received red packets in both case study hospitals, 
although the full picture was not entirely clear because of the sensitivity of the topic. 
This part will present findings from the case studies by examining the scale of the red 
packets in the two hospitals, the major reasons for doctors receiving red packets and 
the response of hospital management. 
 
5.1  The Scale of Informal Payment 
 
Doctors’ formal pay 
 
In both hospitals, doctors’ informal pay is in addition to the formal payment system 
that includes fixed wages and flexible bonuses. Apparently as in most Chinese 
medical institutions where bonuses are associated with institutional revenue (Hsiao, 
2008), the two hospitals have made economic targets their main priority. It should also 
be noted that doctors’ pay is closely related to the development of the local economy, 
which influences residents’ income and ability to afford healthcare. Higher levels of 
economic development in Beijing provides more resources for hospital B to generate 
income, whereas hospital G’s revenue is constrained by the county economy. As a 
result, health care affordability in these two regions influences both doctors’ formal 
pay (revenue-oriented bonuses), and informal pay (red packets). 
 
Table 2  Comparing Doctors’ Formal and Informal Pay in the Two Hospitals 
 Case Hospital B Case Hospital G 
Formal payment   
Pay structure Standard wage + bonus  Standard wage + bonus 
−Standard wage Fixed Fixed 
−Allowance Fixed Fixed 
−Bonus Flexible Flexible 
Bonus determinant Hospital management 
−Director and Party 
Hospital management 
−Party Branch Committee 
  
Committee Standing Member 
Meeting 
−Department directors 
Standing Member Meeting 
−Department directors 
Informal payments Red packets 
Drug company kickbacks 
(unconfirmed) 
Red packets 
Drug company kickbacks 
(unconfirmed) 
Employee voice Nearly none on pay Workers’ Congress discussion 
(limited and symbolic) 
(Source: Fieldwork materials from the case study hospitals) 
 
Table 2 shows the scale of doctors’ formal and informal pay in the two hospitals. 
Strictly speaking, informal payment also includes drug company kickbacks, but in this 
paper the focus is on red packets exchanged between patients and doctors. For doctors’ 
formal pay, it appeared that management discretion is the main pay determination 
method, and this might partly explain the low level of doctors’ satisfaction regarding 
their formal pay. Compared with management’s confident view regarding pay strategy 
and personnel management, doctors’ responses showed contrasting attitudes as 
generally they were not happy. They were also not satisfied with the bonus 
distribution methods and hospital personnel management in general. By contrast, it 
was the point of view of the hospital management that the formal payment systems 
could positively motivate doctors and nurses. The vice director of hospital G 
suggested that compared with the traditional ‘iron rice bowl’ system, the new method 
was intended to ‘break the egalitarianism’. A strategy, combining individual and 
collective performance-related pay, had been adopted by both case study hospitals. By 
linking doctors’ economic performance with their bonuses, it was clear that both 
hospitals aimed to boost service quality, doctors’ commitment and hospital income; 
however, the actual effect did not always match these goals. 
 
Doctors’ informal pay 
 
In both case study hospitals, red packets seem to be a wide-spread phenomenon as 
many doctors admitted that they knew of the existence of red packets somewhere in 
the hospitals. As a consultant said, ‘I think this (red packet issue) is very common, 
especially in those key departments like surgical and cardiology clinics where patients 
and their families are more anxious about the quality of the treatment’ (Interview, 
Hospital B, Traditional Chinese Medicine). But doctors seemed to be very cautious 
about discussing who got red packets, let alone their own practices. So most doctors 
and managers did not want to point fingers or name names, but only claimed that 
there were a few such incidents in general. Nevertheless, most doctors thought that 
receiving red package was unacceptable, although none of them was willing to 
disclose how much he or she could usually get. In addition, not every doctor had 
‘equal’ opportunity to be given informal pay by patients. For instance, one diabetes 
doctor from hospital G complained that he was unhappy to be in his position, because 
the bonus was less and there was no chance to be given anything by patients. He 
assumed that the surgeons were better-paid through red packages. 
Most doctors interviewed agreed that receiving red packets was incorrect although 
they did not deny the existence of the phenomenon. It was believed that as a matter of 
common sense, receiving patients’ money was not only morally wrong, but also 
against medical professional ethics. An obstetrics consultant in case study hospital B 
said that the red packet was common in a few other departments where patients often 
  
provided money to doctors. She said: 
 
…as a doctor, accepting red packets is absolutely wrong after patients have paid 
service fees. The extra and unnecessary money means our service is not purely 
for the public interest but for the private pocket as well. If we all receive red 
packets, what is the purpose of being a professional doctor? But I think the red 
packet phenomenon will decline when the regulations and monitoring 
mechanisms are more comprehensive (Interview, Gynaecology Obstetrics, 
Consultant). 
 
On the other hand, not every doctor had the same opportunity to be given extra 
money by patients privately as people tended to give red packets when they needed 
services that were in high demand. For instance, one doctor from the Technical 
Department said that her colleagues did not have red packets from patients or 
commissions from drug sellers; therefore their income was low although the 
department had very expensive equipment (Interview, Hospital B, Radiology, 
Consultant). 
 
5.2  Why Do Doctors Accept Red Packets? 
 
It is not entirely clear as to why doctors accept red packets, because not all doctors 
would openly discuss this sensitive issue; however, existing evidence from the study 
does show the main reasons for red packets include doctors’ low level of satisfaction 
about their formal pay, their heavy workload, the extent to which patients give red 
packets and management’s half-hearted control over red packets. 
 
Low level of formal pay 
 
Psychologically, red packets are related to lower levels of formal pay, as some doctors 
suggested that their hospitals did not pay them enough so they had to find ways to 
improve their overall income. As a junior doctor hinted, ‘Most doctors do not earn 
enough from their salaries but they could afford to buy cars and properties because 
they had second channels of earnings from their services’ (Interview, Hospital B, 
Internal Medicine). Evidence indicates that doctors in both case study hospitals were 
not satisfied with their pay, and in general they wanted better pay. Furthermore, in 
both hospitals the payment (especially the ‘flexible part’) was unilaterally decided by 
hospital management, while doctors and unions had very limited opportunities to take 
part in the decision making process. To some extent the extra-legal behavior is 
attributed to the low income of Chinese doctors, and it is the marketisation of 
hospitals, not the doctors themselves, to blame (Xinhua News, 2008). One consultant 
from case study hospital B suggested that the most important thing about bonuses was 
‘whether your department is prioritised in the hospital director’s reform plan’ 
(Interview, Hospital G, Radiology, Consultant). He said: ‘Because the priority of the 
hospital is economic output and patients’ charges, there will be more support from the 
hospital leader to the department – including more bonuses – if the department can 
generate more income.’ 
Most doctors interviewed were unhappy with their pay. A female consultant 
complained that the bonus level was so inadequate that ‘The income does not give us 
enough compensation for what we have contributed, which is unfair’ (Interview, 
Hospital B, Gynaecology Obstetrics, Consultant). It appears that doctors’ expectation 
  
of what they should be paid are often compared with other better-paid occupations in 
the public sector, The major comparisons they make are with higher education, 
higher-level hospitals, and civil service and research institutes. Overall doctors in case 
study hospital B thought their monthly income should be from 5,000 to 8,000 Yuan, 
and the case study hospital G doctors wished they could earn as much as 4,000 to 
5,000 Yuan. A few doctors even hoped they could have earnings as high as 10,000 
Yuan a month. A senior consultant from the Gastroenterology Department in case 
study hospital A believed that doctors like him should be paid 10,000 Yuan or more, in 
order to reflect their social contributions. He said: ‘The society is not isolated so we 
should refer to and compare with each other. But we should not compare with doctors 
in foreign countries, who have more free choices than we have’ (Interview 13, 
Hospital B, Gastroenterology, Senior Consultant). 
To some extent, informal income has more or less compensated doctors’ 
‘insufficient’ formal income provided by hospitals. As Lim et al. (2004) have noted, in 
China, ‘poorly paid public sector doctors are resorting to other means of 
compensation such as accepting gifts for favors, or over-prescribing and over-treating 
for profit.’ Arguably, Chinese doctors’ informal income ‘closes the gap between the 
limited payment required under law and a payment more commensurate with the 
quality and attention the patient and the family seek to secure’ (Chen, 2006). 
Regardless of the issues of morality and professional ethics, informal payment does 
give doctors a pay rise to some extent, albeit in a controversial way. 
 
Heavy workload and low morale 
 
It seems that accepting extra payment is associated with heavy workloads because the 
formal payment system does not sufficiently compensate their professional 
contributions. Almost all the respondent doctors said their workload was heavy and 
they had too much pressure. In addition, concerns were raised with regard to the 
pressure and the risk of medical services, as often patients’ expectations were too high. 
When the pressure was combined with a stressful environment and patients’ mistrust, 
things could become worse. A senior consultant in the Cardiovascular Department 
admitted that the pressure was mainly from the risk involved in surgical operations: 
‘The patient’s family cannot understand our doctors, and they always think our 
service should be perfect and mistake-free. If there is an accident they normally 
consider it to be our fault and then they want us to give them huge compensation. We 
are quite nervous because the patients’ families now have more ways to appeal or 
accuse us’ (Interview, Hospital G). 
With the growing pressure from workload and lower levels of morale, some doctors 
wanted higher pay to correspond to these problems. As a doctor stated, ‘I don’t 
normally have red packets but I understand why some of my colleagues do this – 
because they work in very busy environments and their reward has been too little’ 
(Interview, Hospital B, Gastroenterology, Senior Consultant). Ironically, patients are 
not happy with doctors either. A recent national survey shows a deteriorating 
relationship between Chinese hospitals and the public due to relative shortages of 
medical resources and rising medical costs, as many doctors complained of a heavy 
workload, while patients accused doctors of being impatient, money-oriented and 
unethical (China Daily, 2008). 
 
Passivity of being given red packets 
 
  
Another explanation is that many patients just wanted to give extra payment to 
doctors and nurses voluntarily in exchange for better service. Some doctors admitted 
that they had experienced receiving red packets, but they identified themselves as 
passive acceptors rather than demanders. As one consultant in case study hospital G 
declared, he had got ‘something’ from a patient, but he thought that was realistic since 
the patient was a millionaire who insisted on offering a treat. He claimed: ‘I never 
take poor people’s money. Sometimes I even pay fees for those farmers who cannot 
afford our service. But you know I don’t mind if a rich friend wants to thank me by 
treating me with a decent dinner or a good gift. It is natural to receive your friends’ 
presents’ (Interview, Hospital G, Radiology, Consultant). As another consultant stated, 
the general public had a widely accepted view that giving red packets was a norm, 
without which patients would not feel comfortable (Interview, Hospital G, 
Paediatrician). In the two hospitals, it seemed that the Chinese culture had a 
significant impact on the formulation of red packets because it was seen as a way of 
establishing guanxi between the patient and hospital. To some extent, many red 
packets are not always necessary for current treatments but patients might be looking 
to the future and want to establish a long-term relationship with their doctor. The 
guanxi relationship is moderated or balanced by mutual obligations of reciprocity. In 
an organisational context, instrumental guanxi practices may offer opportunities since 
gains and favours are exchanged for personal purposes (Millington, Eberhardt, and 
Wilkinson, 2005); but apparently the nature of guanxi-based red packets in these 
hospitals is seen as corrupt and unethical. 
 
5.3  Doctors’ Cheats and Fiddles 
 
Whatever the reasons were, doctors in these two hospitals fiddled their official duties 
and responsibilities when they accepted red packets. It is obvious that this cheating 
behaviour was against professional standards and legal regulations, because doctors 
gained personal income at the expense of patients’ private money and their hospital’s 
reputation. Informal pay exhibits a conflict of interest between the physician’s 
commitment to quality patient care and their own financial self-interest (Leiderbach, 
2001). Moreover, red packets show the ability of Chinese doctors to fiddle, which 
comes from their professional control over patients because their status and special 
skills are regarded by many as a monopoly power (Mars, 1982). Doctors dared to 
cheat partly due to the fact that they likely understand management’s loose control 
strategies, since there is a low risk for under-the-table red packet transactions that are 
hardly detected by other parties (Kong et al., 2011). 
Many doctors confirmed the existence of red packets in some part of the hospital. 
On the other hand, many doctors did not think red packets were very damaging. Due 
to the peculiarity of the issue, it is extremely difficult to determine the precise 
numbers of red packets, which actually have contributed to the overall income of 
some doctors. For obvious reasons, doctors were reluctant to disclose the accurate 
amount of money they or their colleagues had received, and it was also hard to know 
how many doctors had accepted red packets. When looking at the responses from the 
doctors interviewed, it is interesting to see that most doctors admitted to the existence 
of red packets in some departments, though few would be so frank as to identify 
themselves. Nevertheless, widespread red packets do illustrate the reality of 
corruption in Chinese health services. This phenomenon stands in sharp contrast to 
the government’s call for Chinese doctors to keep morale high when they are 
‘overworked and underpaid’ (Pei et al., 2000), and the assumption that the motivation 
  
for doctors is associated with their ethical requirements (Liu and Mills, 2005). The 
problem also signifies the government’s failure to motivate doctors by using moral 
encouragement through ideological and political education (Pei et al., 2000). 
 
5.4  Management Reactions 
 
Although doctor responses confirmed the existence of red packets in both hospitals, 
management seemed to be confident that red packet activity was rare and under strict 
control. Management also expressed seriously opposition to the behavior. Both 
hospitals had set up ‘professional ethics committees’ and management took a public 
stance against this behaviour. During the fieldwork, the researcher found in case study 
hospital G, there were some wall posters with the words ‘We do not accept red 
packets.’ The vice director of case study hospital G believed that to some extent, his 
hospital had eliminated this controversial activity. He insisted: ‘We are absolutely 
opposed to red packets. As a public hospital, we never allow doctors to accept patients’ 
money or presents. We will discipline any doctor who dares to receive red packets. 
The central and local government have developed effective systems to prevent this 
behaviour. If offending doctors were caught we would terminate their chance to 
upgrade their professional posts. We think the red packet is a very bad thing that 
damages our reputation’ (Interview, Hospital G). In a document from this hospital, it 
is claimed that in 2004, there were 36 doctors in total who ‘refused patients’ red 
packets in various ways’ (Case study Hospital B, 2005, p.3). Management views 
appear to be totally different from doctors’ reflection on red packets, and this might 
be explained in two way – either no red packets exist or management was either 
ignorant or tolerant of the situation. 
One has to acknowledge that red packets have had ‘a negative impact on the 
efficiency of service delivery’ in China (Pei et al., 2000, p.107). Similarly in many 
eastern European countries, unofficial and informal payment has been found to 
provide a ‘significant but possibly distorting contribution to health care financing’ 
(Ensor, 2004, p.237). In Russia there has been ‘thank you money’ for hospital doctors 
inherited from the Soviet era, as the unofficial pay for service system is still common 
(Barr and Field, 1996). Interestingly in this study, hospital management did not take 
this issue too seriously although publicly they condemned this behavior and 
prohibited doctors from accepting red packets. An explanation is that hospitals have 
to publicly prohibit red packets, probably due to the pressures from the health 
authorities and the public. 
In the case study hospitals, department managers acknowledged the existence of 
red packets, and some managers also hinted that receiving patients’ gifts might show 
that doctors’ achievements are recognised by the public. As one manager said: ‘Our 
surgery department has a good reputation for attracting many patients, so our doctors 
are very popular’ (Interview, Surgery Department, Hospital B). Elsewhere a study has 
found that in general, ‘first-line supervisors do not just tolerate fiddles as constraints 
that they are forced to accept but also take them for granted as ways of getting work 
done’ (Edwards, 1988, p.192). For management, the benefit from these kinds of 
informal patterns of behavior is that ‘supervisors find fiddles useful because they give 
workers some interest in the job and thus make the task of supervision easier’ (ibid.). 
As long as management control and organisational reputation is not threatened, 
managers may continue to tolerate such activity. This is because managers may 
‘tolerate a certain amount of fiddling…or some relatively minor sabotage, if it helps 
them to secure control over the workplace’ (Williams and Adam-Smith, 2007, p.285). 
  
 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to fill in a key research gap on conceptualising red packets 
in China by offering a fresh perspective and coverage on this important issue. The 
study extends our understanding of Chinese doctors’ red packet activity by 
reconfiguring the organisational misbehaviour approach and linking informal payment 
with workplace fiddles and management control. Accepting patients’ monetary gifts is 
one of the misbehaviours as doctors overcharge on services for personal profit, 
echoing part of the typology of workplace deviance (Robinson and Bennett, 1995). To 
some extent, the organisational misbehaviour thesis is prevailing for the analysis of 
red packets, which are also related to organisations’ ethical climates (Vardi, 2001) 
such as Chinese hospitals’ corrupt environment. Nevertheless, it is evident that red 
packets, just like other organisational misbehaviours, have had costly and negative 
consequences for both hospitals and patients. 
This study reveals that red packets are the results of low levels of formal pay, 
hospitals’ mismanagement, social attitudes such as guanxi and doctors’ own cheating 
behaviour. Findings demonstrate the scale and impact of red packets in the two case 
study hospitals. Most doctors feel underpaid and de-motivated due to the 
marketisation of services, which lead to their rent-seeking behavior such as red 
packets. This black market of red packets in Chinese hospitals shows that 
management finds it difficult to ‘officially and openly reward those doctors who can 
provide somewhat better quality care to patient’ (Chen, 2006, p.10). Evidently red 
packets are unable to contribute to hospital service efficiency, because only individual 
doctors receive financial gains from informal pay. As Ensor (2004) notes, since 
informal payments relate to the abuse of market power and rent extraction, there is no 
positive effect on health service efficiency and patients have to face increased 
administrative bottlenecks for choosing alternative services. 
There are a few similar features of red packets in the two hospitals, especially in 
management’s covert tolerance compared with hospital public statements against such 
activity. Doctors in both hospitals had similar complaints about low formal pay and 
heavy workloads that are used as excuses for red packets. However, there are some 
aspects that are different between these two hospitals. First, the Beijing hospital 
seemed to be more active in its campaign to eliminate red packets, whereas the 
Guangdong hospital appeared to be less passionate in dealing with the problem, 
though its management did have ‘official’ objections to red packets. Secondly, doctors 
in Beijing were more reluctant to talk about red packets than their Guangdong 
counterparts, partly due to more restrictive regulations imposed by the management in 
Beijing. 
For Chinese doctors, opportunities to take bribes come from their own intention to 
earn more, especially when organisational and social environments give space for 
these transactions to occur. This study also reveals a number of structural issues 
embedded in contemporary China’s public health services – the funding dilemma, 
payment systems, corruption and motivation – but more importantly it demonstrates 
the rationality of employee fiddles and management responses. Doctors are mainly 
responsible for fiddling around red packets because their financial gains exceed the 
legal and ethical boundaries. In this regard, Chinese doctors have some of the 
common characters exhibited within both the ‘hawk’ and ‘vulture’ groups (Mars, 
2008), as they are able to capitalise on their professional status and individual control 
  
of the service while they are not easily detected by colleagues or managers. Even with 
tough sanctions, red packets still exist amongst some doctors in Beijing hospitals, 
because fiddling is part of the elasticity of these professions (Mars, 1982). 
In contrast, although hospital managers have recognised the problem of red packets, 
much of the red packet activity is tolerated because it does not threaten hospitals’ 
reputations unless their activities are exposed to the public. As Blyton and Turnbull 
(1998) highlight, management is primarily concerned with ensuring the productivity 
and cost-effectiveness of their workforce through control and compliance, hoping 
employees will respond with active cooperation and commitment. The study also 
shows the dynamics of conflict and control at the point of production between health 
professionals and management. Managerial control tactics, meanwhile, can vary 
considerably because red packet behavior shows different formalities from time to 
time, ‘and managerial toleration may disappear when conditions change’ (Edwards, 
1988, p.194). 
This is a portrait of a kind of misbehaviour as Chinese doctors deliberately fiddle in 
order to adapt, cope, interpret and challenge hospitals’ rules through red packet 
activity. On the one hand, red packets have helped hospital management to ease the 
tension that arises from the problematic formal payment system. On the other hand, 
the essence of the workplace employment relationship remains as demonstrated 
through conflict and co-operation in Chinese hospitals through red packet fiddles and 
management reactions. But overall Mars’ (1982) examination of workplace cheats 
appears to be an appropriate framework to conceptualise red packets, since the fiddle 
factor exists in workplaces where economic returns are directly relatable to individual 
efforts or skill. Red packets are also a culture phenomenon influenced by guanxi. 
What is more, doctors’ fiddle activities arise partly due to workplace discontent 
towards formal pay, and the complicated and sometimes covert workplace fiddles are 
featured through employees’ illicit cheats and management’s latent control (Edwards, 
1988). If doctors’ official jobs are done, hospitals may be more likely to tolerate red 
packets in a way that would not threaten both managerial authority and organisational 
interests. In other words, doctors’ misbehaviours are under management’s latent 
control as long as hospitals’ income generation and reputation are not seriously 
threatened. 
Admittedly, the study is limited by the sensitivity of the topic, making it extremely 
difficult for respondents to talk freely about their experiences of red packets, because 
most doctors and managers were self-conscious about associating their colleagues and 
themselves with this matter. Analysing red packets would benefit from further study, 
with more data and in-depth evaluation of the circumstances embedded in China’s 
culture context and health service reform. Eventually, a developmental approach is 
helpful to evaluate red packets because misbehaviour ‘continues to develop as an 
organisational phenomenon due to a range of contemporary internal and external 
forces’ (Richards, 2008, p.654). 
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